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AG-GAG LAWS, ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM,
AND THE CONSTITUTION:
WHAT IS PROTECTED SPEECH?
JODI LAZARE*
This article examines the constitutionality of ag-gag legislation that has recently been
adopted by two Canadian provinces and is on the horizon in others. Ag-gag legislation
prohibits activities such as trespass onto agricultural animal operations, gaining entry onto
agriculture operations using false pretences, and interfering with the transport of farmed
animals to slaughter. The analysis draws on case law and literature interpreting section 2(b)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and engages with scholarship related to
animal rights activism, American ag-gag legislation, and feminist animal studies to argue
that ag-gag laws violate the fundamental freedoms protected by the Charter. The article
contends that Canadian ag-gag legislation prevents the communication of messages related
to seeking truth, participation in the political system, and individual human flourishing,
which limits freedom of expression.
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I. INTRODUCTION:
SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT INDUSTRIAL FARMING
On 1 September 2019, approximately 90 animal rights activists staged a “sit-in” at a
southern Alberta turkey farm to protest what they viewed as inhumane treatment of the
resident birds.1 Some of the protestors, members of a group called Liberation Lockdown,2

*
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DCL, McGill University; Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. I am
indebted to Kinnar Power, for excellent research and editorial assistance, and to Sarah Berger
Richardson, Elaine Brooks-Craig, Andrea Levy, Ella Murphy, and Benjamin Perryman for their helpful
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thoughtful and helpful feedback.
Michael Franklin, “Agriculture Minister Strikes Back at Protesters of Southern Alberta Turkey Farm,”
CTV News (5 September 2019), online: <calgary.ctvnews.ca/agriculture-minister-strikes-back-at-protest
ers-of-southern-alberta-turkey-farm-1.4579643>.
Ibid.
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locked themselves inside the barn, while others protested outside.3 Their demands included
“that the media be allowed to film inside the turkey pens” and that some turkeys be liberated
from confinement.4 Although the owner of the farm disputed any claims of mistreatment,
stating that the farm “follows the standards set out by the Alberta Turkey Producers
Association,”5 the protestors’ ultimate objective was “to start exposing the reality of what’s
going on in Canadian farms.”6
On 7 December 2019, 11 animal rights activists occupied a pig farm south of Montreal,
in an attempt to “push the Quebec and Canadian governments to end industrial pork
production.”7 The activists, members of the Montreal branch of Direct Action Everywhere8
— an “international grassroots network of animal rights activists”9 — broadcast footage of
the occupation on Facebook, “denouncing the conditions [in which the animals were kept,
and] saying the animals didn’t have enough room to turn around.”10 In response to the
protest, the president of Quebec’s pork breeders’ association stated that “Canadian animal
welfare standards are among the highest in the world.”11
On 18 February 2020, a main roadway was closed when animal rights activists occupied
a duck farm in Newmarket, Ontario.12 The company’s website states that it is a leader in
animal care:
King Cole has long been heralded for its leadership and stewardship in the area of animal care. Ducks are
raised free run in large spacious barns with plenty of fresh air ventilation, unlimited water and natural feed.
The barns are bedded down with recycled fresh wood shavings daily and washed out for maximum sanitary
13

conditions.

But the activists, who streamed their activities on Facebook, found ducks that were “injured,
sick and dying or already dead in the dark ‘free run’ barn. Others had legs, wings or beaks
stuck in the wire flooring they were standing on.”14
3

4
5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12

13
14

Stephen Hunt, “Animal Rights Activists Occupy Turkey Barn to Protest Treatment,” CTV News (3
September 2019), online: <calgary.ctvnews.ca/animal-rights-activists-occupy-turkey-barn-to-protesttreatment-1.4576885>.
Ibid.
Franklin, supra note 1.
Hunt, supra note 3.
The Canadian Press, “Animal Activists Arrested at Quebec Pork Facility Vow to Continue Fight,” The
Montreal Gazette (8 December 2019), online: <montrealgazette.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-newspmn/animal-activists-arrested-at-quebec-pork-facility-vow-to-continue-fight/wcm/1fc58d23-382e-42efb745-376eedf1d0f6>.
Ibid.
“Direct Action Everywhere,” online: <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Action_Everywhere>. See also
online: <www.directactioneverywhere.com>; Andy Greenberg, “Meet the Activists Risking Prison to
Film VR in Factory Farms,” Wired (5 December 2019), online: <www.wired.com/story/direct-actioneverywhere-virtual-reality-exposing-factory-farms/>; Ezra Klein, “When Doing the Right Thing Makes
You a Criminal,” Vox (5 December 2019), online: <www.vox.com/podcasts/2019/12/5/20995117/
wayne-hsiung-animal-rights-the-ezra-klein-show>.
The Canadian Press, supra note 7.
Ibid.
Debora Kelly, “Animal Rights Protest at King Cole Ducks Temporarily Closed Warden (UPDATE),”
Newmarket Today (18 February 2020), online: <www.newmarkettoday.ca/police-beat/warden-closedfor-animal-rights-protest-at-king-cole-duck-2099766>.
Ibid.
Becky Robertson, “Vegan Activists Just Saved Ducks from an Ontario Farm in Dramatic Rescue,”
online: <www.blogto.com/city/2020/02/vegan-activists-saved-ducks-ontario-farm-dramatic-rescue/>.
Note further that following this investigation, the legal advocacy group Animal Justice filed a false
advertising complaint with the Competition Bureau of Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection
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On 22 June 2015, “[a] number of animal rights protestors gathered on [a Toronto] traffic
island”15 beside a truck carrying 190 pigs to an adjacent slaughterhouse — a “fairly routine
event at that intersection.”16 The activists, members of the Save Movement,17 regularly gather
outside of industrial slaughterhouses in order to “bear witness” to the suffering of industrially
farmed animals, and to bring them some comfort,18 in the form of water or gentle words and
gestures, before they enter the facility to be slaughtered. The practices of the Save
Movement, which began in Toronto in 2011 and has expanded to more than 165 groups
around the world,19 include: “making visible the spaces where killing takes place and the
structural means by which consumer cultures aid and abet that killing ... [and sharing] audio
and visual recordings from the vigils via social media to broader audiences.”20 Following a
verbal confrontation between one of the protesters (Anita Krajnc, the founder of the Save
Movement) and a truck driver that day, Krajnc was subsequently charged with the criminal
offence of mischief. After a week-long trial in 2016, Krajnc was eventually acquitted of the
charge,21 confirming the group and its supporters’ mantra, “compassion is not a crime.”22
In June 2014, CTV Vancouver aired “shocking video” of “horrific animal abuse”23 at “the
largest dairy barn in Canada.”24 The video showed “cows being whipped and beaten with
chains and canes, as well as punched and kicked” and “cows suffering from open wounds
and injuries, and being lifted by their necks with chains and tractors.”25 The footage was
shot by a former employee of the farm, on behalf the animal rights advocacy group,
Mercy For Animals.26 In addition to criminal charges against the perpetrators of abuse,27 the
investigation and resulting media coverage led to boycotts28 and hastened industry reform.29
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Agency. See “Animal Justice Files False Advertising Complaint Against King Cole Ducks for Animal
Cruelty Cover-Up,” online: <www.animaljustice.ca/blog/animal-justice-files-false-advertising-com
plaint-against-king-cole-ducks-for-animal-cruelty-cover-up>. See also Letter from Kaitlyn Mitchell,
Staff Lawyer, Animal Justice to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency and the Competition Bureau of
Canada re: King Cole Ducks Ltd’s False, Deceptive and Misleading Advertising Claims Contrary to the
Food and Drugs Act, the Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, and the Competition Act (16 April
2020), online: <animaljustice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2020-04-14-King-Cole-Ducks-False-Ad
vertising-Complaint-FINAL.pdf>.
R v Krajnc, 2017 ONCJ 281 at para 2 [Krajnc].
Ibid at para 3.
Ibid at para 91.
See Anita Krajnc, “Bearing Witness: Is Giving Thirsty Pigs Water Criminal Mischief or a Duty?” (2017)
23:2 Animal L 479 at 494.
Ibid at 481.
Maneesha Deckha, “The Save Movement and Farmed Animal Suffering: The Advocacy Benefits of
Bearing Witness as a Template for Law” (2019) 5 Can J Comparative & Contemporary L 77 at 82.
See Krajnc, supra note 15 at para 143.
See Krajnc, supra note 18 at 493.
“‘Horrific’ Abuse of Cows at B.C. Dairy Farm Caught on Video,” CTV News (9 June 2014), online:
<www.ctvnews.ca/canada/horrific-abuse-of-cows-at-b-c-dairy-farm-caught-on-video-1.1860892>.
Kelsey Johnson, “Dairy Community Shocked by B.C. Abuse Allegations,” iPolitics (10 June 2014),
online: <ipolitics.ca/2014/06/10/dairy-community-responds-with-shock-to-b-c-abuse-allegations/>.
“Chilliwack Cattle Sales to Fire 8 Workers Caught on Tape Abusing Cows,” CBC News (9 June 2014),
online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/chilliwack-cattle-sales-to-fire-8-workers-caught-ontape-abusing-cows-1.2670098>.
Ibid.
See R v Blackwell and Larson, 2017 BCPC 228; R v Keefer, Vandyk and Visser, 2017 BCPC 142.
See Mike Clarke, “Chilliwack Cattle Sales Boycott Threatened over Animal Abuse Video,” CBC News
(15 June 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/chilliwack-cattle-sales-boycottthreatened-over-animal-abuse-video-1.2676340>.
Jennifer Feinberg, “Dairy Industry Reacts to Animal Abuse Charges Against Massive Chilliwack Dairy
Farm,” Cloverdale Reporter (4 March 2016), online: <www.cloverdalereporter.com/news/dairyindustry-reacts-to-animal-abuse-charges-against-massive-chilliwack-dairy-farm/>; Susan Mann, “New
Canadian Dairy Program Will Prohibit Tail Docking,” online: <www.betterfarming.com/onlinenews/new-canadian-dairy-program-will-prohibit-tail-docking-61375>.
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Farm occupations, covert rescues, protests, and undercover investigations by animal rights
activists are neither novel nor isolated incidents. For years, animal rights activists (as well
as journalists, novelists, and scholars) have entered industrial farms and slaughterhouses to
document practices that cause immense physical and psychological suffering to animals and
to expose those practices, and the associated suffering, to the broader public.30 In the United
States, “[s]ince at least the Industrial Revolution,” the products of undercover investigations
and exposés “have played a central role in allowing the American public and the political
branches of government access to the closed-door goings on of certain industries.”31 In North
America, “there have been more than 100 such undercover investigations of livestock farms
conducted” since 1998.32 Research from the US suggests that “the work of these investigative
groups is emerging as the ‘primary information source’ about animal welfare for
consumers,”33 in large part because “[p]ublic relations campaigns by the industry tell only
one side of the story.”34 Thus, where public access to knowledge about food production is
concerned, “there is no viable alternative to an undercover investigation of the commercial
agricultural industry.”35 In short, animal rights activism — in the form of farm occupations,
protests, undercover investigations, and the resulting exposés — produces information that
is otherwise kept hidden and that is crucial to public discourse on society’s treatment of
animals and on the ethics and morality of meat consumption and food production methods.
In recent months, however, following in the footsteps of the US, Canadian legislatures have
begun to buckle down on these activities by prohibiting the conduct necessary to produce
information about industrial farming and, in consequence, stifling the spread of the
information that that conduct uncovers.
This article critically examines legislation that was recently adopted in two Canadian
jurisdictions prohibiting activities such as trespass onto agricultural animal operations,
gaining entry onto farms using false pretences, and interfering with the transport of farmed
animals to slaughter. Known as ag-gag (agricultural gag) laws,36 similar legislation has been
adopted, and deemed unconstitutional, in a number of American jurisdictions.37 This article
sketches out part of the analytical framework for evaluating the constitutionality of ag-gag

30
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See e.g. Ted Conover, “The Way of All Flesh: Undercover in an Industrial Slaughterhouse,” online:
<harpers.org/archive/2013/05/the-way-of-all-flesh/>; Timothy Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds:
Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).
Alan K Chen & Justin Marceau, “High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment” (2015) 68:6
Vand L Rev 1435 at 1455. See also Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (New York: Doubleday, 1906).
JA Robbins et al, “Awareness of Ag-gag Laws Erodes Trust in Farmers and Increases Support for
Animal Welfare Regulations” (2016) 61 Food Policy 121 at 121.
Chen & Marceau, supra note 31 at 1468.
See ibid: “Organized farm tours and carefully chaperoned visits will not produce the same accurate
images or truthful information that has become the centerpiece of the American debate on farmed animal
welfare.”
Ibid.
See Mark Bittman, “Who Protects the Animals?” The New York Times (26 April 2011), online:
<opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/>.
See Amanda S Whitford, “Animal Welfare Law, Policy and the Threat of ‘Ag-gag’: One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back” (2019) 3 Food Ethics 77; Meredith Kaufman, “The Clash of Agricultural
Exceptionalism and the First Amendment: A Discussion of Kansas’ Ag-Gag Law” (2019) 15:1 J Food
L & Policy 49; Animal Legal Defense Fund v Wasden, 878 F(3d) 1184 (9th Cir 2018) [Wasden]; Animal
Legal Defense Fund v Herbert, 263 F Supp (3d) 1193 (D Utah 2017) [Herbert]; Animal Legal Defense
Fund v Reynolds, 353 F Supp (3d) 812 (SD Iowa 2019) [Reynolds]; Western Watersheds Project v
Michael, 353 F Supp (3d) 1176 (D Wyo 2018) [Michael]; Animal Legal Defense Fund v Schmidt, 434
F Supp (3d) 974 (Kan Dist Ct 2020) [Schmidt].
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legislation in the Canadian context. The first part sets out the legislative background,
breaking down the legislation in Alberta and Ontario, and describes the legal treatment of
farmed animals in Canada. The next part then argues that the legislation constitutes a limit
to the right to freedom of expression protected by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.38 It suggests that the activities in question constitute protected
expression of the highest magnitude and that the legislation accordingly limits expressive
conduct, both with respect to entry onto farms and interference with transport vehicles. In
consequence, the legislation merits careful scrutiny by legislators considering ag-gag
legislation in their jurisdictions and, where legislation in force is challenged, by the courts.
The analysis draws on case law and literature interpreting section 2(b) of the Charter and
engages with scholarship related to animal rights activism, American ag-gag legislation, and
feminist animal studies to argue that ag-gag laws unequivocally constitute a violation of the
fundamental freedoms protected by the Canadian Charter. The article is primarily doctrinal
in nature, as it is based on case law and legislation. New in Canada, ag-gag legislation has
not received significant scholarly attention. Thus, in addition to providing the analytical
framework with which to approach Canadian ag-gag legislation, this article fills an important
gap in Canadian constitutional literature by contributing to the discourse on the constitutional
dimensions of animal rights advocacy. Importantly, the article does not weigh in on the
second part of the constitutional analysis — that is, whether Canadian ag-gag legislation,
assuming it does constitute a limit to fundamental freedoms, may be “justified in a free and
democratic society,” pursuant to section 1 of the Charter and the R. v. Oakes test.39 Before
addressing that question in subsequent work, it is worth making explicit that the activities
targeted by Canadian ag-gag are in fact protected; while the prohibition on entry under false
pretences clearly engages section 2(b), the same is not immediately obvious regarding
prohibitions on interacting with animals in transport — a fundamental feature of expression
by members of the Save Movement. Thus, this article illustrates the capacity of animal rights
activism, in a variety of forms, to promote democratic and constitutional values.
II. CONTEXT: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
TO FARM OCCUPATIONS AND THE SAVE MOVEMENT
This part examines the current Canadian landscape where ag-gag legislation is concerned,
looking closely at the recently adopted legislation. Further, it briefly explains the legislative
context surrounding the welfare of farmed animals, insofar as that context forms part of the
motivation behind animal rights activism in Canada. Lastly, it touches on the American
situation, given that Canadian legislation mirrors legislation deemed unconstitutional in the
US.

38
39

Section 2(b), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11 [Charter].
Ibid, s 1; R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 [Oakes].
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ALBERTA

In November 2019, legislators in Alberta introduced Bill 27, the Trespass Statutes
(Protecting Law-Abiding Property Owners) Amendment Act, 2019.40 For present purposes,
the most relevant effect of Bill 27 is to prohibit unauthorized entry onto private property, so
that every person who enters “without the permission of the owner or occupier of the land
if entry is prohibited … or fail[s] to leave land immediately after being directed to do so by
the owner or occupier of the land or a person authorized by the owner or occupier” is guilty
of an offence.41
For an individual, regardless of whether any damage is caused to the premises, the penalty
for a first offence is a fine of up to $10,000, up to $25,000 for a second offence, and
imprisonment for up to six months or both.42 For their part, corporations are subject to fines
of up to $200,000 for trespass itself, or for counselling or aiding in the commission of an
offence, whether or not the offence takes place.43
From a constitutional division of powers perspective, Alberta is within its jurisdiction over
“Property and Civil Rights in the Province” to enact fines for trespass onto private property.44
But the division of legislative powers does not immunize legislation from Charter scrutiny,
where it restricts or punishes the utterance of specific words or spoken messages. Bill 27
does precisely this where it states: “[f]or the purposes of [the trespass provision], a person
who obtains by false pretences permission to enter on land from the owner or occupier of the
land is deemed to have entered on the land without permission.”45 Accordingly, an individual
who lies or omits information in order to gain entry onto a farm, and is permitted to enter
based on that lie or omission, is deemed to have trespassed and is subject to the applicable
penalty. In other words, Bill 27 effectively prohibits the undercover investigation of a
privately owned facility, whether by an animal rights activist, as was the case in Chilliwack,
set out earlier, an undercover journalist, or anyone else.
Bill 27 progressed from first reading through third reading in a short nine days, receiving
royal assent just eight days later, so it is difficult to uncover the motivations behind its
adoption with any real certainty. But the Hansard does contain some explanations, including
the intention to make “sure that property rights are respected in the province of Alberta [and]
that landowners can feel safe in their homes knowing that law-abiding citizens are
protected.”46 Moreover, the introduction of Bill 27 was preceded by a discussion of “Animal

40
41
42
43
44

45

46

1st Sess, 30th Leg, Alberta, 2019 (assented to 5 December 2019), SA 2019, c 23 [Bill 27 (Alta)].
Ibid, s 3(2)(a) (amending ss 2(1)(a)–(b) of the Petty Trespass Act, RSA 2000, c P-11). Section 5(2) of
the Bill also amends the Trespass to Premises Act, RSA 2000, c T-7, ss 2–3 to similar effect.
Trespass to Premises Act, ibid, s 3(1).
Ibid, s 3(2).
See Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(13), reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No
5. It is worth noting, however, that provincial legislatures may not, in the guise of regulating within their
legitimate jurisdictions, adopt criminal legislation, which is the exclusive power of the federal
government. See R v Morgentaler, [1993] 3 SCR 463. While this article is limited to the Charter
implications of ag-gag legislation, future work might consider the constitutionality of provincial ag-gag
laws pursuant to the constitutional division of legislative powers.
Bill 27 (Alta), supra note 40, s 3(2) (amending Petty Trespass Act, s 2(2.4)). See also section 5(2)
(amending Trespass Premises Act, s 2(4)): “a person who enters on premises having obtained by false
pretences permission to enter on the premises from the owner of the premises or an authorized
representative of the owner of the premises is deemed to have trespassed on the premises.”
Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 30-1 (19 November 2019) at 2336 (Doug Schweitzer).
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Rights Activist Farm and Ranch Protests.”47 That discussion referred to the need to protect
business owners like turkey farmers and included the following statements by the Member
of the Legislative Assembly for Banff-Kananaskis, where, just days before the introduction
of the Bill, animal rights activists occupied a sled dog facility:
[I]llegal invasion of private property is dangerous to business owners and animals that live and work on these
properties and it’s harassing to property owners and … we cannot allow facilities like [the sled dog tour
operator] to become unfair targets of radical activists.
…
[It] seems that protestors are feeling emboldened lately when it comes to demonstrating on and illegally
occupying private property all the while slandering and spreading false narratives about innocent business
owners.

48

One other legislative development in Alberta merits attention. In May 2020, Alberta
adopted Bill 1, the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act.49 Similar to Bill 27, the Act aims to
reinforce “public safety” and to “strengthen penalties against those who would lawlessly
trespass or jeopardize public safety by seeking to block critical public infrastructure,
including roadways, railways, and other important infrastructure.”50 Like Bill 27, it too
targets activism: “[i]t increases the dissuasive effect of law against those who would seek to
hold us all jeopardy to their [referring to protestors and activists] radical demands.”51 Instead
of being limited to private property, however, Bill 1 prohibits the wilful obstruction,
interruption, or interference with “any essential infrastructure”52 — the definition of which
includes highways and agricultural operations.53 Bill 1 provides for the same maximum
penalties as Bill 27, but also includes a mandatory minimum fine of $1,000 for a first and
subsequent offence on the same premises.54 Although Bill 1 was introduced primarily in
response to blockades by “green zealots and eco radical thugs” opposed to pipeline
development and oil and gas extraction,55 the breadth of the bill means that it could easily
capture farm occupations and the types of activities carried out by the Save Movement, set
out in the Introduction.
B.

ONTARIO

In December 2019, the Ontario Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs introduced
Bill 156, An Act to protect Ontario’s farms and farm animals from trespassers and other

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Ibid at 2335.
Ibid (Miranda Rosin).
2nd Sess, 30th Leg, Alberta, 2020 (assented to 17 June 2020), SA 2020, c C-32.7 [Bill 1 (Alta)].
Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 30-2 (25 February 2020) at 4 (Premier Jason Kenney).
Ibid.
Bill 1 (Alta), supra note 49, s 2.
Ibid, s 1.
Ibid, s 3.
Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 30-2 (26 February 2020) at 12 (Michaela Glasgo).

90

ALBERTA LAW REVIEW

(2020) 58:1

forms of interference and to prevent contamination of Ontario’s food supply.56 Per the
Minister’s introduction of the legislation at first reading:
The bill is intended to protect farm animals, the food supply, farmers and others from risks that are created
when trespassers enter places where farm animals are kept or when persons engage in unauthorized
interactions with farm animals. The risks include the risk of exposing farm animals to disease and stress, as
57

well as the risk of introducing contaminants into the food supply.

With respect to trespass, Bill 156 is similar to Alberta’s Bill 27, insofar as it creates
offences and severe penalties for unauthorized entry and invalidates consent to enter based
on false pretences.58 In Ontario, entry under false pretences “in the prescribed circumstances
or for the prescribed reasons” is deemed trespass.59 Ontario’s legislation is, in some respects,
more limited than Alberta’s, and in others, more far-reaching. On one hand, Bill 156 targets
only the food supply; it prohibits unauthorized entry into an “animal protection zone,”
defined, “with respect to a farm, animal processing facility or prescribed premises,” as “an
area on the farm, facility or premises on which farm animals may be kept or located,”
whether or not the zone has been identified with specific signage.60 It is also an offence to
deface, damage, or remove a sign identifying an animal protection zone.61 On the other hand,
Bill 156 goes further than Alberta’s law by creating prohibitions related to the transportation
of farmed animals, thus covering the same activities as Alberta’s Bill 1. These include
prohibitions on “stop[ping], hinder[ing], obstruct[ing] or otherwise interfer[ing] with a motor
vehicle transporting farm animals,”62 and on “interfer[ing] or interact[ing] with a farm animal
being transported by a motor vehicle without the prior consent of the driver of the motor
vehicle.”63 In sum, by covering farms, processing facilities, and transportation, Ontario’s
legislation aims to put a stop to farm occupations and protests by animal rights activists,
undercover investigations by activists and journalists, and the activities of the Save
Movement.
In June 2020, Ontario’s Standing Committee on General Government held two days of
virtual committee hearings, where animal rights activists, animal rights lawyers, legal
experts, and agriculture industry stakeholders testified.64 Animal rights activists, lawyers, and
legal experts were unanimous in their view that the legislation would stifle activists’ ability

56
57
58
59

60
61
62
63
64

1st Sess, 42nd Leg, Ontario, 2020 (assented to 18 June 2020), SO 2020, c 9 [Bill 156 (Ont)].
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 42-1, No 134 (2 December 2019)
at 6522 (Ernie Hardeman).
Importantly, however, the Ontario legislation does not provide for the possibility imprisonment or for
an increased penalty where an organization or corporation is involved in a trespass.
Bill 156 (Ont), supra note 56, s 5(6). Regulations setting out “prescribed circumstances” and “prescribed
reasons” are expected by the end of 2020. See Allison Devereaux, “Livestock Truckers Express Safety
Concerns Outside Ontario Meat Processing Plants,” CBC News (9 August 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/
news/canada/london/livestock-truckers-express-safety-concerns-outside-ontario-meat-processing-plants1.5673362?__vfz=medium%3Dsharebar>.
Bill 156 (Ont), ibid, s 2.
Ibid, s 5(7).
Ibid, s 6(1).
Ibid, s 6(2).
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government, “Security from Trespass
and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020” Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 42-1, No G-25 (8 June
2020) [Ont Standing Ctee G-25]; Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General
Government, “Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020” Official Report of Debates
(Hansard), 42-1, No G-26 (9 June 2020).
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to express themselves and undercover investigators’ ability to gain entry onto farms,65 while
industry representatives expressed support for the legislation. Despite the concerns
expressed, Bill 156 received royal assent on June 18. At the time of writing,66 Bill 156 is not
yet in force and the government plans to seek public input on regulations in late August
2020.67
Since the adoption of Bill 156, demonstrations have increased in frequency, as have
tensions between animal rights activists and supporters of animal agriculture.68 On 19 June
2020, Regan Russell, a long-time animal rights activist and member of the Save Movement,
was struck by a transport truck and killed while bearing witness outside of a Toronto
slaughterhouse.69 Many have drawn connections between Russell’s death and the adoption
of Bill 156.70 Since then, supporters of animal agriculture have held counter-protests
alongside Save Movement vigils, confronting activists, alleging that Russell committed
suicide, and barbecuing hot dogs next to the trucks transporting pigs to slaughter.71 Tensions
surrounding this issue are clearly running high.
C.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS

This article focuses primarily on the legislation recently adopted in Alberta and Ontario,
given its obvious interactions with Charter rights. Nevertheless, it is worth briefly
mentioning related legislative moves throughout the country, given that, taken together, these
novel anti-trespass statutes constitute an unprecedented move in strengthening political
protections of an already powerful Canadian industry to the potential detriment of informed
popular discourse on a matter of fundamental public importance. Moreover, for legislatures
currently contemplating similar bills, the analysis contained here might prove useful in
highlighting the potential constitutional problems with ag-gag legislation.
As in Alberta and Ontario, strengthened anti-trespass legislation has been introduced in
British Columbia and at the federal level. British Columbia’s Bill M 227, Trespass
Amendment Act, 2019, imposes strict penalties for trespassing on or contaminating a “food
establishment,” which is defined as “any place where, or any vehicle in which, in the
ordinary course of business, food is grown, raised, cultivated, kept, harvested, produced,
65
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manufactured, slaughtered, processed, prepared, packaged, distributed, transported or sold,
or is stored or handled for any purpose.”72 Bill M 227 was introduced for first reading in
October 2019.73 At the federal level, Bill C-205, was introduced for first reading in February
2020.74 An Act to amend the Health of Animals Act creates the offence, punishable on
summary conviction or indictment, of “exposure of the animals to a disease or toxic
substance,” which prohibits entering a place where animals are kept, “knowing that or being
reckless as to whether entering such a place could result in the exposure of the animals to a
disease or toxic substance that is capable of affecting or contaminating them.”75 The motion
to introduce the Bill referred specifically to the pig farm occupation south of Montreal,
mentioned in the Introduction, and to the “numerous protests on farm property and process
plants across this country.”76
In Manitoba, ministerial mandate letters to both the Minister of Agriculture and Resource
Development and the Minister of Justice, issued in early March 2020, contained instructions
to “review legislation and enforcement policies relating to on-farm trespassing.”77 Finally,
following the pig farm occupation detailed above, and at the urging of Quebec’s Union
des producteurs agricoles (the province’s association of agricultural producers),78 the
Government of Quebec announced the establishment of a working group to study how other
Canadian jurisdictions have approached animal rights activism on private property.79
D.

FARMED ANIMAL WELFARE IN CANADA

This article explores the Charter implications of ag-gag laws in Canada. It is not a study
of animal welfare on Canadian farms. However, a basic understanding of the realities of
industrial animal farming in Canada helps to illustrate why the messages of animal rights
activists merit constitutional protection. In Canada, there is no federal law governing the
conditions in which animals destined for consumption are bred, raised, or housed. While the
Criminal Code contains prohibitions on animal cruelty,80 it is well-known that the language
of the Criminal Code, which applies to “wilfully [causing] unnecessary … suffering,”81 is
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generally not interpreted to capture standard agricultural industry practices.82 Accordingly,
“[m]any standard practices in factory farming, including tail docking, castration, beak
cutting, and confinement in extremely small spaces, [which] involve severe suffering for
animals,” are not considered criminal offences in Canada, where they are carried out in the
industrial context.83
The constitutional division of powers in Canada means that jurisdiction over animals is
shared, so that each province has its own statute governing animal protection, which typically
prohibits causing an animal to be in distress.84 While the details vary from province to
province, what the provincial statutes have in common is an exemption, either express or
implied, for agricultural or farming practices.85 In some provinces, the exemption refers to
industry codes of practice.86 This is a reference to the National Farm Animal Care Council
(NFACC), a group of industry stakeholders that produces non-binding codes of practice
across animal agriculture sectors.87 While the codes are an improvement over a complete
absence of oversight and regulation on farms,88 they endorse the propriety of the standard
practices listed above,89 essentially “[c]odifying the status quo.”90 Moreover, given their nonlegislated character, the codes are of “ambiguous legal status.”91 In short, for proponents of
the humane treatment of animals, the NFACC codes are of little consequence when it comes
to the ongoing suffering that industrially farmed animals are forced to endure. As Lesli
Bisgould writes:
The use of codes and generally accepted practices allows an industry which has broad effects on all animals
… to regulate many important aspects of its own behaviour in accordance with its own priorities.… Codes
are used not only as a defence to any charge that might be laid, but more broadly to deflect growing criticism
of intensive handling systems. In perpetuating this state of affairs, corporations have normalized a state of
disgrace, and both federal and provincial governments have abdicated their responsibilities.
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To be clear, the welfare of industrially farmed animals is not entirely unregulated. The
Health of Animals Regulations,93 adopted under the federal Health of Animals Act,94 set out
the conditions in which animals are to be transported to slaughter. These regulations, which
were amended in 2019, provide maximum intervals during which animals may be transported
without food, water, and rest.95 For all farmed animals aged eight days or younger, the
maximum time is 12 hours.96 The same goes for all “compromised” animals.97 For ruminants,
like cows and sheep, the maximum time is 36 hours without food, rest, or water.98 For
monogastric animals, such as horses and pigs, the maximum is 28 hours.99 Hatchling birds
may be transported for a maximum of 72 hours from the time they are hatched.100 For
“broiler chickens,”101 “spent hens,”102 and rabbits, the maximum is 24 hours without water
and 28 hours without food.103 Further, the regulations do not contain any concrete
requirements with respect to temperature and weather conditions — a serious omission given
the extreme temperatures experienced in Canada, in both summer and winter. Instead, the
regulations prohibit transport “if the animal is likely to suffer, sustain an injury or die due to
inadequate ventilation or by being exposed to meteorological or environmental
conditions.”104 Given the lack of material guidance as to what kind of exposure is enough to
lead to suffering or death, it is difficult to seriously maintain that animals do not suffer when
exposed to extreme weather while being transported long distances for extended periods of
time in open-sided vehicles.105 Indeed, 1.59 million animals per year “are reported as dead
on arrival at their final destination.”106 For these reasons, Canada has become notorious for
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having the worst industrial animal transport regulations in the developed world.107 It is easy
to appreciate both the desire of animal rights activists to share this information as a means
of garnering support for the goal of effecting change to society’s use and treatment of farmed
animals and the political dimensions of animal rights activism, elaborated on below.
E.

AG-GAG IN THE UNITED STATES

Ag-gag laws are not unique to Canada. Legislation aimed at protecting industrial animal
agriculture goes back decades, at least, in the US.108 The term “ag-gag” was coined by New
York Times columnist Mark Bittman in 2011.109 More recently, American legal scholar Justin
Marceau described ag-gag legislation as “anti-animal rights and anti-food justice laws,” that
can be broken down into three distinct waves or eras, going back to the mid-1990s,110 all of
which “share a common purpose: incapacitating an increasingly influential movement — the
animal rights movement.”111 Indeed, since its inception, American ag-gag legislation has
functioned as a response to undercover investigations of animal-use facilities and their
consequences, such as boycotts and animal-friendly legislative reforms.112 Most relevant to
the Canadian context are laws that criminalize what Marceau and Alan Chen refer to as
“investigative deceptions,” defined as “intentional, affirmative misrepresentations or
omissions about one’s political or journalistic affiliations, educational backgrounds, or
research, reportorial, or political motives to facilitate gaining access to truthful information
on matters of substantial public concern.”113 Investigative deceptions are, in other words, the
types of statements targeted by the “false pretences” provisions of the Canadian legislation
that is the subject of this article.114
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Ibid at 1344.
See Herbert, supra note 37 at 1196 for a judicial summary of the background to and history of American
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As of 2019, at least 11 American jurisdictions had adopted some form of ag-gag
legislation.115 At least five of those laws have been ruled unconstitutional in whole or in
part,116 with at least four cases successfully challenging prohibitions on gaining entry onto
a farm under false pretences as violations of the First Amendment right to free speech.117
Moreover, while the constitutional analysis of the Canadian legislation may draw inspiration
from American case law and scholarship, given the repeated challenges in the US, ag-gag
is not limited to North America. Similar legislation exists in Australia, where “undercover
surveillance has been used by animal protection agencies as a tool to improve animal welfare
since at least the 1970’s,”118 and 2019 saw an attempt to introduce a form of ag-gag
legislation in France.119
Ag-gag legislation is a growing phenomenon, with clear implications for Canadian
constitutional freedoms. Moreover, and beyond that primary concern, its associated harms
may very well outweigh any purported benefits. Qualitative research in the US demonstrates
that public awareness of ag-gag laws reduces trust in farmers.120 Indeed, whereas
trustworthiness depends in large part on “the extent to which individuals or organizations are
perceived to be transparent about their practices,”121 ag-gag legislation, by “criminalizing
investigative deceptions,” aims to “shield from public scrutiny matters that are indisputably
of public concern,”122 thus completely limiting transparency where the treatment of
industrially farmed animals is concerned. Moreover, as Amanda Whitfort writes, the case law
in the US demonstrates that these laws are more of a risk to policy-makers than a solution
to any perceived threat to the animal agriculture industry.123 As explained, this article does
not deal with justification under section 1 of the Charter. But the fact that ag-gag legislation
limits transparency around the practices of industrial animal agriculture and, consequently,
activists’ ability to obtain and share information is relevant to the idea that ag-gag legislation
constitutes a limit to the kind of expression protected by section 2(b).
III. AG-GAG LAWS VIOLATE THE
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
This part draws on Canadian case law and scholarship to demonstrate that ag-gag laws not
only violate the Canadian right to freedom of expression, but that they also strike at the very
heart of the reason the Constitution protects free speech. Canadian scholarship on freedom
of expression suggests that the Charter provision serves multiple interconnected purposes.
On the one hand, its purposes are instrumental: the right to speak and listen freely is
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fundamental to a healthy democracy and the promotion of truth.124 It is for this reason that
political expression is said to lie “at the very heart of the values sought to be protected by …
[section] 2(b) of the Canadian Charter.”125 On the other hand, expression has value for its
own sake as it promotes the development of the autonomous individual.126 Further, freedom
of expression might be understood as fundamental to social life and community; without a
listener, speech risks becoming meaningless.127 “[D]eeply social in character,”128 it is through
expression that individuals are able to meaningfully participate in public discourse.129
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has identified three underlying values that freedom
of expression is said to promote. Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court in the leading
decision on the subject, Chief Justice Dickson summarized them as follows:
(1) [S]eeking and attaining the truth is an inherently good activity; (2) participation in social and political
decision-making is to be fostered and encouraged; and (3) the diversity in forms of individual self-fulfillment
and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment not
130

only for the sake of those who convey a meaning, but also for the sake of those to whom it is conveyed.

In Irwin Toy, the Supreme Court set out a framework for demonstrating a limit to section
2(b). Where the purpose of a limit is to restrict a particular message from being expressed
— a content-based restriction — freedom of expression is prima facie limited and the burden
shifts to the government to justify that limit.131 Where a restriction is content-neutral — that
is, where it is aimed at the physical consequences of the expression and not its specific
message — a claimant must demonstrate that the effect of the impugned law is to prevent
them from engaging with the underlying values of freedom of expression.132 In other words,
a claimant must demonstrate that the restriction has the effect of preventing them from
seeking or attaining the truth, participating in social or political decision-making, or pursuing
individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing.133 The following parts break down the
legislation to demonstrate that in both of its significant elements — prohibiting vigils or
demonstrations outside of slaughterhouses and prohibiting entry based on false pretences —
Canadian ag-gag legislation constitutes a prima facie (purpose-based) restriction on freedom
of expression. Moreover, the kinds of speech targeted by ag-gag — speech by animal rights
activists and those who seek to expose the violence of industrial animal agriculture — fulfill
all of the underlying purposes of section 2(b) and accordingly merit the most robust
constitutional protection.
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SLAUGHTERHOUSE PROTESTS AND
INTERFERENCE WITH A MOTOR VEHICLE

Ontario’s Bill 156 makes it an offence to interfere with a motor vehicle transporting
animals to slaughter. For its part, Alberta’s revised anti-trespass statute, together with Bill
1, creates the same effective prohibition on protests by animal rights activists on public roads
outside of slaughterhouses. It seems straightforward that restricting protest activities
constitutes a prima facie limit to the Charter right to freedom of peaceful assembly, set out
in section 2(c) of the Charter.134 What is less clear is the relationship between the activities
of protestors — bearing witness through vigils by members of the Save Movement — and
the protection of freedom of expression. However, bearing witness to the suffering of
industrially farmed animals is precisely the type of activity that section 2(b) is meant to
protect.
The purpose of the transport-related provisions is to restrict a particular type of protest —
vigils outside of slaughterhouses, regularly organized by the Save Movement. It is not, in
other words, a content-neutral restriction. Indeed, in Ontario at least, the restriction is specific
to spaces outside of animal-use facilities and to vehicles transporting animals; it does not
extend to demonstrations on public roads more generally and it is clearly aimed at
suppressing the expressive activity of members of the Save Movement. Whereas bearing
witness involves speaking to, petting, and “[coming] as close as possible to the suffering of
the animals,”135 the legislation explicitly prohibits interactions with animals in transport.136
This kind of targeted restriction on a specific expressive meaning is enough to make out a
prima facie limit to freedom of expression. However, a government defending the
constitutionality of the legislation might successfully argue that the limit is content-neutral
and that it is aimed at protecting against the physical consequences of the expression —
threats to biosecurity, contamination of the food system, and threats to the safety of animal
transporters.137 But while the purpose may be construed as constitutionally legitimate, the
effects of the legislation impede activists’ abilities to pursue the underlying values of
freedom of expression.
As explained in the Introduction, the Save Movement, which organizes regular vigils
outside of slaughterhouses around the world, has a number of core practices. Among them
are the act of “making visible the spaces where killing takes place and the structural means
by which consumer cultures aid and abet that killing ... [and sharing] audio and visual
recordings from the vigils via social media to broader audiences.”138 For members of the
Save Movement, then, bearing witness to animals headed to slaughter is “an exercise in
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truth-telling,”139 as well as information-sharing. Maneesha Deckha explains that bearing
witness has the power to stimulate criticism of the food system and catalyze change among
consumers of farmed animal products.140 It is a form of “social signalling” — a means of
“expressing publicly visible compassion” to “humans who have never questioned the animal
agricultural system, but who are eyewitnesses to, for example, Toronto Pig Save’s protest
in person or online.”141
The Save Movement, in other words, carries out the exact type of truth-seeking activity
that the Charter is understood to protect. In the context of political speech and election
spending limits, former Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major wrote: “[f]reedom of
expression protects not only the individual who speaks the message, but also the recipient.
Members of the public — as viewers, listeners and readers — have a right to information on
public governance.”142 By making visible the realities of industrial agriculture as it affects
animals, members of the Save Movement share their truth with the broader public. They
enable viewers and listeners to make informed choices about their food and about their
consumer habits. Indeed, in the US, animal rights investigations and video recordings, as “a
manner of revealing broader truths,”143 have been “critical to advancing public discourse and
influencing policy reforms” related to the treatment of farmed animals.144 Further, as
Marceau and Chen point out, “the widespread dissemination of these and other similar videos
[like those of the Save Movement] importantly informs moral debates about the manner in
which we relate to nonhuman animals, including whether people should reduce or eliminate
animal products from their diets.”145 Significantly, the majority of Americans who convert
to a vegan or vegetarian diet are influenced by what they have learned about “commercial
farming and animal treatment” in recent years.146
Similar data is not yet available in Canada. But doctrinally, the Canadian public’s right
to information, as corollary to the speaker’s right to free expression and truth-seeking, is
constitutionally protected, as it is in the US. Significantly, in Canada, that right was recently
interpreted to extend to consumer choices around ethical food consumption. In Kattenburg
v. Canada (Attorney General), the Federal Court determined that food product labelling
requirements relating to the ethical dimensions of a product’s creation engage the “Charter
Values” of freedom of conscience and freedom of expression.147 Justice Mactavish reasoned:
“[i]n order to be able to express their political views [through their purchasing choices],
consumers need to have accurate information as to the origin of the products under
consideration.”148 Indeed, the failure to disclose the kind of information that might influence
a person’s purchasing choice constitutes a “[limit to] their Charter-protected right to freedom
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of expression.”149 In other words, freedom of expression, where ethical consumption is
concerned, protects the right to seek out the true information that is necessary to that
expression. As an “exercise in truth-telling,”150 one that enables members of the public to
express their consumer preferences, the activities of the Save Movement are precisely the
sort of thing that section 2(b) protects; restricting members of the Save Movement from
carrying out their activities undoubtedly has the effect of limiting freedom of expression.
Roadside vigils are also political in nature; prohibiting them prevents activists and
listeners alike from participating in social and political discourse and decision-making. The
political value of animal activism, and the sharing of information by activists, has been
confirmed in more than one jurisdiction. The majority of the High Court of Australia, for
example, has held that “the discussion of animal welfare is a legitimate matter of public
concern.”151 In the US, investigations by animal rights activists are understood as “[relating]
to a matter of great political significance or public debate.”152 In Canada, as noted, the
Federal Court has reasoned that personal consumer choices are a means of expressing
political views, as protected by freedom of expression.153
Animal studies scholars have written extensively about the “politics of sight” at work in
the act of revealing the suffering of industrially farmed animals. Timothy Pachirat, for
example, in his ethnography of industrialized slaughter, describes “what [he terms] a politics
of sight, defined as organized, concerted attempts to make visible what is hidden … in order
to bring about social and political transformation.”154 This is precisely what members of the
Save Movement try to do in drawing attention, through roadside vigils and demonstrations,
to what most members of the public do not typically see: industrially farmed animals as
sentient individuals, and not as food. Members of the Save Movement also approach vehicles
stopped in traffic and hand out literature about industrial farming and animal suffering to
passersby.155 In this sense, the Save Movement, like other successful animal advocacy
initiatives, understands that “seeing alone is not enough.”156 The political impact of
slaughterhouse protests depends not only on members of the public seeing “the horrors that
befall animals,” but on their understanding “the contexts that make those horrors
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unnoticeable”157 — that is, the dynamics of the animal industrial complex,158 and the
“structural means by which consumer cultures aid and abet [in killing animals].”159
There is a clear connection between animal rights activism outside of slaughterhouses and
participation in broader social and political discourse. Kathryn Gillespie writes: “the act of
witnessing animals’ predicaments, and then sharing their stories, is a political act that resists
the erasure of individual animal lives, suffering, and deaths.”160 But bearing witness means
“more than just watching.”161 Witnessing invites “recognition of the animal subject that
attends to the ways in which our conception of ourselves — as observers, consumers,
humans — is characterized by grave power imbalances.”162 Bearing witness, in other words,
by “undermining the effects of oppression and domination,”163 both requires and facilitates
a political response.164 Moreover, the feminist ethic-of-care theoretical tradition, home to
much scholarship on our ethical relationships with animals,165 holds that attention to animal
suffering necessarily involves “attention to the political and economic systems that are
causing the suffering.”166
Public demonstration is “a mode of political expression.”167 The “freedom to assemble …
in an alternative public sphere … is essential to the vitality of the democratic institutions
themselves.”168 Public demonstrations, like the activities targeted by the legislation in Ontario
and Alberta, “allow for a framing of political discourse in the terms of those concerned”169
— that is, animal rights activists and members of the public interested in listening. Public
demonstrations involve a “‘repoliticization’ of areas of life previously consigned to
bureaucratic silence by making them topics of public discourse and, thus, subject to
collective decision making.”170 As highlighted above, the treatment of industrially farmed
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animals, during their short lives and en route to their deaths, has not been a political priority
in Canada. The activities of the Save Movement, then, by documenting and sharing videos,
images, and information on the kind of suffering involved in Canadian animal agriculture,
force the subject into public discourse. Indeed, “the public visibility [of bearing witness]
contributes to the emergence of an alternative animal-friendly discourse on how humans and
corporations should treat animals.”171 It can also generate “an alternative legal discourse on
animals that highlights the intensities in violence of what the law currently permits in animaluse industries.”172 In short, there is little doubt that where participation in political life is
concerned, the prohibition on street protests and interference with motor vehicles
transporting animals constitutes a clear limit to freedom of expression.
Finally, the activities of animal rights activists outside of slaughterhouses are a means of
pursuing individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing. Of the three underlying reasons
that the Charter protects freedom of expression, individual self-fulfillment and human
flourishing may have garnered the least amount of attention, either scholarly or judicially,
perhaps because the connection is so clear. Canadian scholar of fundamental freedoms
Richard Moon suggests all expression, regardless of content, relates to human flourishing:
“[w]e become individuals, capable of thought and judgment, and we flourish as rational and
feeling persons when we join in conversion with others and participate in the life of the
community.”173 Where the courts are concerned, it is well-known that the threshold for
finding that an individual’s pursuit of self-fulfillment and human flourishing has been limited
is not high. For example, “engaging in lawful leisure activities,” such as an erotic dance
show, “promotes such values” and prohibitions on doing so constitute a limit to section
2(b).174 The same is true with regard to the distribution of “hard core” pornography and
“sexual paraphernalia.”175 It stands to reason that engaging in protest activities as an
expression of one’s deep moral and ethical commitments would necessarily involve the
pursuit of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing. Further, in addition to truthseeking, the ability of individuals to make informed consumer choices, one of the objectives
of the Save Movement, is also understood as “an important aspect of individual selffulfillment and personal autonomy.”176 But even aside from the informational function of
slaughterhouse protests, sharing one’s deep moral convictions about animal use and
exploitation, whether in the hopes of persuading others or simply as a means of personal
fulfillment, surely promotes individual autonomy and human flourishing.
B.

ENTRY UNDER FALSE PRETENCES

As seen above, Canadian ag-gag legislation prohibits entry onto farms under false
pretences by deeming such entry trespassing.177 False speech and intentional deceit may not
relate to the fundamental values underlying freedom of expression as clearly as the content
of protests on public roads outside of slaughterhouses, but as non-violent speech acts with
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a particular content, restrictions on them nevertheless constitute prima facie limits to freedom
of expression.178 Moreover, as speech precedent to the kind of animal rights activism that is
clearly protected by section 2(b) — similar to the activism carried out by the Save Movement
— lies by animal rights activists seeking entry onto farms in order to film the treatment of
animals and disseminate their footage constitute protected speech.179 In other words,
“investigative deceptions” are “preparatory to speech” that clearly relates to the underlying
values of freedom of expression.180
Pointing to the work of novelist Upton Sinclair, and to his undercover investigations of
the meat-packing industry in early twentieth century America,181 Chen and Marceau suggest
that without investigative deceptions of the sort targeted by Canadian ag-gag legislation,
“much information critical to public discourse would have remained secret.”182 But
investigative deceptions, and the lies necessary to their success, have revealed knowledge
of industries outside of agriculture as well:
Since at least the Industrial Revolution, lies have played a central role in allowing the American public and
the political branches of government access to the closed-door goings on of certain industries. From prisons,
to mental hospitals, to schools, to the meatpacking industry, lies have facilitated award-winning journalism,
183

prompted changes in public behavior, and led to major legislative reforms.

In the Canadian context, then, prohibitions on gaining entry onto agricultural premises
under false pretences might be seen as paving the way for limiting access to any kind of
information that an industry might prefer to keep out of public view. In constitutional terms,
the prohibition on investigative deceptions of factory farms restricts freedom of expression
both in purpose and in effect.184
Canadian ag-gag laws constitute a clear limit to section 2(b). The targeted activities,
grounded in the belief that the public should be made aware of the harmful practices of
industrial farming and food production, promote the underlying values of freedom of
expression. Indeed, the message of animal rights activists does not represent the marginalized
or radical view of a few dissenting voices — although those views would nevertheless
benefit from constitutional protection. Rather, as suggested, the ideas being stifled by ag-gag
laws are questions “of grave public concern…. Issues regarding food safety, consumer
protection, and the environment are of public concern because they can be ‘fairly considered
as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.’”185
Ultimately, whereas freedom of expression “protects the individual’s freedom to
communicate with others,”186 Canadian ag-gag legislation prevents the communication of
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messages related to seeking truth, participating in the political system, and individual human
flourishing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ag-gag legislation, with its effective prohibitions on undercover investigations and
roadside demonstrations, aims to inhibit the spread of fundamental information relating to
food production in this country. The targeted messages do not only bring to light the brutal
abuses inherent in industrial animal agriculture, but they also force listeners to grapple with
the ethics of animal exploitation and consumption. Accordingly, the legislation in Alberta
and Ontario (and on the legislative horizon elsewhere in the country), targets the kind of
expression that sits at the heart of section 2(b) of the Charter and the right to freedom of
expression. Truth-seeking exercises that are political in nature and fundamental to the selfactualization of animal rights activists, bearing witness and exposing the practices of
industrial animal farming, are “social [interventions],”187 vital to the enlightened dialogue and
discourse that characterize liberal democracies.
The introduction of ag-gag legislation is a legislative response to seemingly increased
hostilities between animal rights activists and industrial stakeholders, as a result of the types
of activities detailed in the Introduction to this article. Indeed, it is likely not a coincidence
that the legislation comes at a time of shifting norms related to meat consumption and
increased knowledge of the harms associated with industrial animal agriculture. While firm
numbers are difficult to come by, vegetarianism and veganism seem to be on the rise,188
evidenced, for example, by the increased and widespread availability and consumption of
plant-based meat substitutes.189 Moreover, the connection between industrial animal
agriculture and climate change, stemming from the fact that industrial animal farms are
among the most significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions, continues to attract
attention.190 And, most recently, in light of the COVID-19 global health pandemic,191 the
public is becoming increasingly aware of the connections between industrial farming, animal
cruelty, and exploitation,192 and the spread of zoonotic diseases.193 Given the circumstances,
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it is not surprising that the industry would seek ways to insulate itself from further public
scrutiny or critique, as it has done in successfully lobbying provincial governments to adopt,
or introduce, ag-gag legislation. However, as this article has sought to demonstrate, ag-gag
legislation amounts to “government and corporate interference on the free exchange of
information that can contribute to greater understanding of the food system.”194 In other
words, ag-gag constitutes an attack, by government, on constitutionally protected speech and
the public’s right to know. The effect of the legislation is to shield private corporations from
scrutiny of their routine practices that cause untold suffering. Ag-gag legislation prevents
speech that seeks to spread truth about animal agriculture, enable participation in democratic
discourse, and promote self-fulfillment for both speaker and listener alike. This should not
be taken lightly, either by legislators or by courts.
This article has addressed only one part of the constitutional analysis. It remains to be
considered whether Canadian ag-gag legislation may be justifiable “in a free and democratic
society.”195 I will address this question in later work, but in short, it is difficult to argue that
the limits to freedom of expression set out here meet the requirement for a rational
connection between the legislative objective and the means chosen to achieve it, as well as
the requirement that the means chosen are the least impairing way of achieving the objective,
assuming that the objective itself is valid. While protecting biosecurity and the safety of
farmers and the food system are laudable goals, justification requires the government to bring
persuasive evidence that these things are threatened by farm occupations and slaughterhouse
protests. With that in mind, future work will query whether these stated objectives are in fact
pressing and substantial, as interpreted in the relevant case law. Moreover, the justification
analysis will draw on the relevant legislative debates, the Canadian case law and literature
on proportional balancing,196 and the case law out of the US,197 to suggest that there is no
rational connection between prohibiting either entry under false pretences or slaughterhouse
protests and the goal of protecting farmer safety, biosecurity, and the food system. Indeed,
one Canadian judge, citing the absence of evidence, has already rejected the suggestion that
members of the Save Movement threaten food safety.198 Further, drawing on examples from
Canada and beyond, future work will suggest that neither Ontario nor Alberta’s legislation
is minimally impairing in light of the legislative objective. There are ways to protect
biosecurity and farmer and food safety without limiting freedom of expression. This article,
then, in addition to highlighting the ability of animal rights activism to promote the values
underlying freedom of expression, has laid the groundwork for the remainder of the
constitutional analysis, by setting out the issues at stake and attempting to enhance our
understanding of the constitutional dimensions of animal rights advocacy in Canada.
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